PIRRO DE ÉLIS (360 - 270 a.C.)
It was a Greek philosopher of Classical Antiquity and is credited as being the
first Greek skeptic philosopher.
Life
Pyrrho was from Elis, on the Ionian
Sea. Diogenes
Laertius, quoting from Apollodorus of Athens, says that Pyrrho
was at first a painter, and that pictures by him were exhibited in the
gymnasium at Elis.
Later he was diverted to philosophy by the works of Democritus, and according to Diogenes Laertius became acquainted
with the Megarian dialectic through Bryson, pupil of Stilpo.
Diogenes reports further that
Pyrrho, along with Anaxarchus, travelled with Alexander the Great on his exploration of the
East, 'so that he even went as far as the Gymnosophists in India and the Magi' in Persia. This exposure to
Eastern philosophy seems to have inspired him
to adopt a life of solitude; returning to Elis,
he lived in poor circumstances, but was highly honored by the Elians and also
by the Athenians, who conferred upon him the rights of citizenship.
Pyrrho wrote nothing. His
doctrines were recorded in the writings of his pupil Timon of
Phlius. Unfortunately these works are mostly lost. Today Pyrrho's ideas are
known mainly through the book Outlines of Pyrrhonism written by Sextus
Empiricus.
Philosophy
Pyrrho is renowned for
creating the first formal approach to skepticism in Western Philosophy: Pyrrhonism.
A summary of Pyrrho's
philosophy was preserved by Eusebius, quoting Aristocles, quoting Timon, in what is known
as the "Aristocles passage."
"Whoever wants to live
well (eudaimonia) must consider
these three questions: First, how are pragmata (ethical matters,
affairs, topics) by nature? Secondly, what attitude should we adopt towards
them? Thirdly, what will be the outcome for those who have this attitude?"
Pyrrho's answer is that "As for pragmata they are all adiaphora (undifferentiated by a logical differentia), astathmēta
(unstable, unbalanced, not measurable), and anepikrita (unjudged,
unfixed, undecidable). Therefore, neither our sense-perceptions nor our doxai
(views, theories, beliefs) tell us the truth or lie; so we certainly should not
rely on them. Rather, we should be adoxastous (without views), aklineis
(uninclined toward this side or that), and akradantous (unwavering in
our refusal to choose), saying about every single one that it no more is than
it is not or it both is and is not or it neither is nor is not.[1]
The main principle of
Pyrrho's thought is expressed by the word acatalepsia, which connotes
the ability to withhold assent from doctrines regarding the truth of things in their own nature; against every statement its
contradiction may be advanced with equal justification.
Pyrrhonians (or Pyrrhonism)
can be subdivided into those who are ephectic (a
"suspension of judgment"), zetetic ("engaged in seeking"),
or aporetic ("engaged in refutation").[2]
Indian influences on Pyrrho
Diogenes Laertius' biography
of Pyrrho[3] reports that
Pyrrho traveled with Alexander the Great's army to India and based
his philosophy on what he learned there:
...he even went as far as the
Gymnosophists, in India,
and the Magi. Owing to which circumstance, he seems to have taken a noble line
in philosophy, introducing the doctrine of incomprehensibility, and of the
necessity of suspending one's judgment....
The sources and the extent of
the Indian influences on Pyrrho's philosophy, however, are disputed. Elements
of scepticism were already
present in Greek philosophy, particularly in the Democritean tradition in
which Pyrrho had studied prior to visiting India. Pyrrhonism was a logical
extension of these, requiring no exogenous influences. Richard Bett heavily discounts any
substantive Indian influences on Pyrrho, arguing that on the basis of testimony
of Onesicritus regarding how
difficult it was to converse with the gymnosophists, as it required three
translators, none of whom understood any philosophy, that it is highly
improbable that Pyrrho could have been substantively influenced by any of the
Indian philosophers.[4]
According to Christopher I. Beckwith's analysis of the
Aristocles Passage, adiaphora, astathmēta, and anepikrita are strikingly
similar to the Buddhist Three marks of existence,[5] indicating that
Pyrrho's teaching is based on Buddhism. Beckwith disputes Bett's argument about
the translators, as the other reports of using translators in India, involving Alexander the Great and Nearchus, say they needed only one interpreter, and
Onesicritus was criticized by other writers
in antiquity for exaggerating. Besides, Pyrrho spent about 18 months in India, which is
long enough to learn a foreign language.[6]
It has been hypothesized that
the gymnosophists were Jains, or Ajnanins ,[7][8][9] and that these
are likely influences on Pyrrho.
See also
Notes
1. Beckwith,
Christopher I. (2015). Greek
Buddha: Pyrrho's Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia
(PDF). Princeton University Press.
pp. 22–23. ISBN 9781400866328.
2. Pulleyn,
William (1830). The Etymological Compendium, Or, Portfolio of Origins and
Inventions. T. Tegg. p. 353.
3. "The
Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers".
Peithô's Web. Retrieved March 23, 2016.
4. Richard Bett, Pyrrho, His Antecedents and His Legacy,
2000, p177-8.
5. Beckwith,
Christopher I. (2015). Greek
Buddha: Pyrrho's Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia
(PDF). Princeton University Press.
p. 28. ISBN 9781400866328.
6.
Beckwith, Christopher I. (2015).
Greek Buddha: Pyrrho's Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central
Asia. Princeton
University Press.
p. 221. ISBN 9781400866328.
7.
Barua 1921, p. 299.
8.
Jayatilleke 2013, pp. 129-130.
9.
Flintoff 1980.
References
·
Encyclopædia
Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University
Press.
·
Algra, K., Barnes, J., Mansfeld, J.
and Schofield, M. (eds.), The Cambridge
History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
·
Annas, Julia and Barnes, Jonathan, The
Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations,Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985.
· Barua,
Benimadhab (1921). A History
of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy
(1st ed.). London:
University of Calcutta. p. 468.
·
Beckwith, Christopher I., Greek Buddha. Pyrrho's Encounter with Early
Buddhism in Central Asia, Princeton
University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2015.
·
Bett, Richard, "Aristocles on
Timon on Pyrrho: The Text, Its Logic and its Credibility" Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 12, (1994): 137-181.
· Bett,
Richard, "What did Pyrrho Think about the Nature of the Divine and the
Good?" Phronesis 39, (1994): 303-337.
·
Bett, Richard, Pyrrho, His
Antecedents, and His Legacy, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000.
·
Brunschwig, Jacques,
"Introduction: the Beginnings of Hellenistic Epistemology" in Algra,
Barnes, Mansfeld and Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge
History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999, 229-259.
·
Burnyeat,
Myles (ed.), The Skeptical Tradition, Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1983.
·
Burnyeat, Myles and Frede, Michael
(eds.), The Original Sceptics: A Controversy, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997.
·
Doomen, Jasper, "The Problems
of Scepticism" Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 10
(2007): 36-52.
·
Halkias, Georgios, "The
Self-immolation of Kalanos and other Luminous Encounters among Greeks and
Indian Buddhists in the Hellenistic world". Journal
of the Oxford
Centre for Buddhist Studies, Vol. VIII, 2015: 163-186.
·
Hankinson, R.J., The Sceptics,
London:
Routledge, 1995.
· Jayatilleke,
K.N. (1963). Early Buddhist
Theory of Knowledge (PDF) (1st
ed.). London:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd. p. 524.
·
Kuzminski, Adrian, Pyrrhonism;
How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2008.
·
Long, A.A., Hellenistic
Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, University of California
Press, 1986.
·
Long, A.A. and Sedley, David, The
Hellenistic Philosophers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
·
Striker, Gisela, "On the
difference between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics" in G. Striker, Essays
on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996,
135-149.
·
Striker, Gisela, "Sceptical
strategies" in G. Striker, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and
Ethics, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996, 92-115.
·
Striker, Gisela, "The Ten
Tropes of Aenesidemus" in G. Striker, Essays on Hellenistic
Epistemology and Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 116-134.
·
Svavarsson, Svavar Hrafn,
"Pyrrho’s dogmatic nature", The Classical Quarterly, 52
(2002): 248-56.
·
Svavarsson, Svavar Hrafn,
"Pyrrho’s undecidable nature", Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy, 27 (2004): 249-295.
External links
·
Laërtius, Diogenes
(1925). "Others: Pyrrho".
Lives of the Eminent Philosophers.
2:9. Translated by Hicks, Robert Drew
(Two volume ed.). Loeb Classical Library.
Pyrrho (c. 360—c. 270 B.C.E.)
Pyrrho was a Greek
philosopher from Elis,
and founder of the Greek school of skepticism. In his youth he
practiced the art of painting, but passed over this for philosophy. He studied
the writings of Democritus, became a disciple of Bryson, the son of Stilpo, and
later a disciple of Anaxarchus. He took part in the Indian expedition of
Alexander the Great, and met with philosophers of the Indus
region. Back in Greece
he was frustrated with the assertions of the Dogmatists (those who claimed to
possess knowledge), and founded a new school in which he taught fallibilism, namely that
every object of human knowledge involves uncertainty. Thus, he argued, it is
impossible ever to arrive at the knowledge of truth (Diog. Laert, 58). It is related that he
acted on his own principles, and carried his skepticism to such an extreme,
that his friends were obliged to accompany him wherever he went, so he might
not be run over by carriages or fall down precipices. It is likely, though,
that these reports were invented by the Dogmatists whom he opposed. He spent a
great part of his life in solitude, and was undisturbed by fear, or joy, or
grief. He withstood bodily pain, and when in danger showed no sign of
apprehension. In disputes he was known for his subtlety. Epicurus, though no
friend to skepticism, admired Pyrrho because he recommended and practiced the
kind of self-control that fostered tranquillity; this, for Epicurus, was the
end of all physical and moral science. Pyrrho was so highly valued by his
countrymen that they honored him with the office of chief priest and, out of
respect for him, passed a decree by which all philosophers were made immune
from taxation. He was an admirer of poets, particularly Homer, and frequently
cited passages from his poems. After his death, the Athenians honored his
memory with a statue, and a monument to him was erected in his own country.
Pyrrho left no writings, and we owe our knowledge of
his thoughts to his disciple Timon of Phlius. His philosophy, in common with
all post-Aristotelian systems, is purely practical in its outlook. Skepticism
is not posited on account of its speculative interest, but only because Pyrrho
sees in it the road to happiness, and the escape from the calamities of life.
The proper course of the sage, said Pyrrho, is to ask himself three questions.
Firstly we must ask what things are and how they are constituted. Secondly, we
ask how we are related to these things. Thirdly, we ask what ought to be our
attitude towards them. As to what things are, we can only answer that we know
nothing. We only know how things appear to us, but of their inner substance we
are ignorant. The same thing appears differently to different people, and
therefore it is impossible to know which opinion is right. The diversity of
opinion among the wise, as well as among the vulgar, proves this. To every
assertion the contradictory assertion can be opposed with equally good grounds,
and whatever my opinion, the contrary opinion is believed by somebody else who
is quite as clever and competent to judge as I am. Opinion we may have, but
certainty and knowledge are impossible. Hence our attitude to things (the third
question), ought to be complete suspense of judgment. We can be certain of
nothing, not even of the most trivial assertions. Therefore we ought never to
make any positive statements on any subject. And the Pyrrhonists were careful
to import an element of doubt even into the most trifling assertions which they
might make in the course of their daily life. They did not say, "it is
so," but "it seems so," or "it appears so to me."
Every observation would be prefixed with a "perhaps," or "it may
be."
This absence of certainty applies as much to practical
as to theoretical matters. Nothing is in itself true or false. It only appears
so. In the same way, nothing is in itself good or evil. It is only opinion,
custom, law, which makes it so. When the sage realizes this, he will cease to
prefer one course of action to another, and the result will be apathy (ataraxia). All action is the result of
preference, and preference is the belief that one thing is better than another.
If I go to the north, it is because, for one reason or another, I believe that
it is better than going to the south. Suppress this belief, learn that the one
is not in reality better than the other, but only appears so, and one would go
in no direction at all. Complete suppression of opinion would mean complete
suppression of action, and it was at this that Pyrrho aimed. To have no
opinions was the skeptical maxim, because in practice it meant apathy, total
quietism. All action is founded on belief, and all belief is delusion, hence
the absence of all activity is the ideal of the sage. In this apathy he will
renounce all desires, for desire is the opinion that one thing is better than
another. He will live in complete repose, in undisturbed tranquillity of soul,
free from all delusions. Unhappiness is the result of not attaining what one
desires, or of losing it when attained. The wise person, being free from
desires, is free from unhappiness. He knows that, though people struggle and fight
for what they desire, vainly supposing some things better than others, such
activity is but a futile struggle about nothing, for all things are equally
indifferent, and nothing matters. Between health and sickness, life and death,
difference there is none. Yet insofar as we are compelled to act, we will
follow probability, opinion, custom, and law, but without any belief in the
essential validity or truth of these criteria.
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